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RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS:
THOUGHTS AFTER A DECADE
A. Mark Weisburdt
I am grateful to the William Mitchell Law Review for offering me the
opportunity to express my views on a number of issues that come to mind
now that a decade has passed since the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11
attacks). Several of the questions callfor expertise I lack, so I will primarily
comment on the legal issues the questions raise.
1.

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?

In my view, the 9/11 attacks led to several developments
affecting American security. I will first address the non-legal effects
and then examine the legal effects.
L

Non-legal Issues

Any statement of my views on the non-legal consequences of
the 9/11 attacks on American security must necessarily be brief,
since I lack the expertise to provide more than the views of one
well-informed (I hope) layman. With that caveat, I have three
observations.
First, it seems to me that the risk of hijacking commercial
aircraft in the United States has declined significantly. News
reports suggest that other countries have also tightened their
security procedures for both passenger and cargo flights.
Second, it appears that the risk that Pakistan's nuclear
weapons could fall into the hands of Islamist terrorists is greater
t
Reef C. Ivey, II Distinguished Professor of Law, School of Law, University
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1. E.g., Louise Cainkar, Introduction: Global Impacts of September 11, 24(1)
COMP. STUD. OF S. ASIA, AFR. & THE MIDDLE E. 155, 155-58 (2004); Simon Duke,
CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifing the Weakest Link, 7 FUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 153 (2002); Reaction From Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,

2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/reaction-from-around-the-world
.html.
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today than in 2001. I say this because of the frequent reports of
greatly increased activity by violent Islamist groups within Pakistan,
apparently as a collateral effect of the continuing war in
Afghanistan. Further, there seems to be some reason to believe
that elements of the Pakistani military are sympathetic to such
groups.' The possession of nuclear weapons by Islamist terrorist
groups would pose obvious dangers to a number of states,
including the United States.
Third, while the 9/11 attacks led to significant changes in
Afghanistan and, of course, the United States, there have been
developments in other areas as well. There seems to have been an
increase in the overall degree of international cooperative efforts to
deal with terrorism, in terms of intelligence collection, interdiction
of financing, and actions by security forces directly against terrorist
groups. It seems, for example, that the United States provided
various kinds of assistance to Indonesia in that country's apparently
successful effort to eliminate a particularly violent terrorist group
active in its territory. On the other hand, groups professing some
sort of connection with al Qaeda are active in the southern
portions of the Arabian Peninsula and, most recently, in Nigeria;
this was not the case, at least to the same degree, in 2001. Also, a
terrorist group long active in western North Africa has renamed
itself al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and affiliated with al Qaeda,5
and there is reason to believe that al Shabaab in Somalia is
cooperating with al Qaeda.3 In this connection, it also seems

2. See, e.g., Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 20, 2012) http://topics.nytimes.com
Varun
/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html;
Vira & Anthony H. Cordesman, Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability, A National Net
Assessment 22-42 (Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies, Working Draft, 2011), available
at http://csis.org/files/publication/ 110504_stabilizing-pakistan.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Salman Masood, Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant
Ties, N.Y. TIMEs,June 21, 2011, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=all.
4.
AND

THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31362, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO EAST
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available at
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http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31362.pdf (outlining the amounts of money
the U.S. gave to Indonesia from 2005-2009).
5. E.g., Mark Mazzetti, Al Qaeda Affiliates Growing Independent, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2011, at A8, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/world
/asia/30qaeda.html ("[A] North African militant group that eventually agreed to
rename itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.").
6. E.g., Al Shabab, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top
("Shabab leaders
/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/al-shabab/index.html
have claimed affiliation with Al Qaeda since 2007.").
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reasonable to wonder whether the world would be closer to a
resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians if the
9/11 attacks, and the reactions to it, had not taken place.
In short, it seems that, while we are safer from some dangers,
other dangers present more serious threats now than in 2001.
II. Legal Issues
The main legal developments since the 9/11 attacks can be
divided between those affecting international law and those
affecting American domestic law.
A.

InternationalLaw

Several significant developments in international law were
prompted by the 9/11 attacks. First, the cooperation against
terrorists was structured in part through adherence, by a number of
countries, to treaties addressed to various aspects of terrorist
functioning. While these treaties had been in existence prior to
September 11, 2001, a number of states, including the United
States, did not become parties to those treaties until after the 9/11
attacks. In the same connection, international organizations,
especially the United Nations, have been the vehicles for
cooperation to a striking extent. In adopting Resolution 1373,' the
United Nations Security Council imposed a binding legal
obligation on states to take certain actions aimed at preventing
terrorism' and established a structure for monitoring state
compliance with that resolution.9
It is also noteworthy that the United Nations Security Council's
resolution 1368, adopted on September 12, 2001, included the
following language:
Determined to combat by all means threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence in accordance with the Charter,
1. Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11
September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of
7.
8.
9.

S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
Id.
1-2.
Id. 7 6-7.
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international terrorism, as a threat to international peace
and security. . . .

This language seems to mean that the 9/11 attacks triggered
the right of the United States to engage in self-defense,
notwithstanding the fact that the attacks were the work of a
terrorist group, not a state. This would seem to establish that a
state threatened by terrorist groups based in a second state is
exercising its inherent right of self-defense if it uses force against
such groups within the territory of the second state, if the second
state is either unwilling or unable to control the terrorists. To be
sure, the International Court ofJustice has re ected this conclusion
in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, ] but that conclusion

says more about the court than it does about the state of
international law. Perhaps for this reason, the use of armed drones
to kill persons actively involved in terrorist operations, but located
in other states, seems less controversial than it was in 2001, at least
if the persons targeted will not, for whatever reason, be arrested by
local authorities.
It is also worth mentioning that the negative reaction to the
Bush Administration's use of interrogation techniques that fit the
12
definition of torture under the Convention Against Torture seems
to have underscored the depth of international opposition to that
practice.
Beyond these clear developments, the 9/11 attacks have forced
international lawyers to address certain issues that received little
attention prior to that date. One of the most basic is the question
of the treatment accorded terrorists. The basic tension is between
treating the issue as a matter of criminal law or, alternatively,
treating it as a matter of the law of war. If terrorists are treated
solely as criminals, seizing them is arresting them, which means
that those seizing the terrorists must comply with all of the
requirements necessary to make an arrest. In particular, they may
not be killed unless, at the time force is used against them, they are
actively threatening physical harm to someone. Under American
law, they are entitled to a lawyer as soon as they are seized, and the

10. S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl., 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)
(emphasis in original).
11. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.CJ. 168, 222-23 (Dec. 19).
12. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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lawyer may be present when they are interrogated. They can be
punished only if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they
are guilty of specific crimes, and the punishment must take the
form of a criminal sentence. If, however, the law of war provides
the appropriate framework, then a terrorist found on a battlefield
bearing arms against the United States may be shot on sight. He
may be seized without the protections of arrest and held, without
trial, until the end of hostilities, in conditions no better than those
accorded a prisoner of war. Such persons are not entitled to a trial
if not charged with a crime and are likewise not entitled to legal
assistance during interrogation.
The rationale for applying the law of war is straightforward.
While the focus of a criminal prosecution is establishing
responsibility for a past event, the focus of the law of war is
preventing future harm. It is in that context that shooting, on
sight, members of an enemy force, disabling prisoners from
inflicting future harm by holding them until hostilities end, and
interrogating prisoners without legal assistance can be justified.
The rationale for treating terrorists as criminals is simply that the
acts they are supposed to have committed will surely be crimes
under the law of some state, and the proper response to crime is
criminal prosecution. This disagreement continues especially with
respect to terrorists operating in areas far from the scene of active
combat operations but nonetheless engaged in planning and
attempting to execute operations directed at, for example, the
United States. There is a related uncertainty regarding the length
of time terrorists captured on the battlefield may be detained.
Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, "[p]risoners of war shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.""
Assuming for the sake of argument that captured terrorists are
entitled to no more protection than this treaty would accord enemy
military personnel captured in a conventional war, how long can
such captives be held, given that the shape of terrorist groups
makes most unlikely any formal end to the conflict with al Qaeda?
Yet another legacy of the 9/11 attacks is the attention paid to
the reach of human rights treaties. For example, the European
Court of Human Rights has held that Great Britain was obliged to

13. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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apply the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms to areas in Iraq assigned to British forces.14
B. Domestic Law
The domestic legal legacy of the 9/11 attacks has included
breathtaking claims of executive authority, which, in part, have
been turned back by the Supreme Court (for example, the claim
that an American citizen arrested in the United States could be
held indefinitely, without trial). The Bush Administration claimed
as well that it was authorized to use interrogation techniques
amounting to torture, despite prohibitions in both domestic law
and international law. Distressingly, some persons continue to
assert that the United States should use such techniques, brushing
aside legal questions.15 Similarly, the continuing insistence from
some quarters that terrorists never be tried in the United States and
always be tried by a military tribunal seems more of a gut reaction
than a considered opinion.
To be sure, issues said by some to arise from actions taken by
the executive seem easily resolved. For example, there seems little
doubt that an American citizen captured outside the United States
while fighting for a terrorist group against the United States is
entitled to no better treatment than noncitizens in a similar
position. And no doubt the September 18, 2001, Authorization of
Use of Military Force (the AUMF) allows the military
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons [the President]
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the

14914. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.
150 (2011). It is interesting that, in reaching this result, the court treated the fact
that British forces had been assigned responsibility for the area as equivalent to
138-49, despite the British
exercising effective control over the area, id.
argument that the situation on the ground severely limited its ability to exercise
control. Id. 1 22, 30. Also, although Britain argued that its obligations under
articles forty-two to fifty-six of the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, and articles twenty-seven to
thirty-four and forty-seven to seventy-eight of the Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, superseded any obligations it might have under the European
Convention, the court made no reference to that argument in reaching its result.
Id. 11 37, 89.
15. Jackie Kucinich, GOP's Foreign Policy Test; CandidatesFace Tough Challenge
vs. Obama, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2011, at 5A.
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terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or
16
persons.
This leaves such persons in detention conditions no better
than those accorded prisoners of war-though the issue discussed
above, that is, the duration of such confinement in the context of a
conflict that will never formally end is relevant to this issue as well.
Between clearly excessive claims of executive authority and
unduly broad challenges to that authority, difficult issues remain.
One such issue is the extent of the authority conferred on the
President by the AUMF. Groups formerly unconnected to al Qaeda
have affiliated with that organization-for example, al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; other
groups, such as al Shabaab, not claiming to be al Qaeda affiliates,
have nonetheless cooperated with al Qaeda in actions directed
against the United States. Given the focus of the AUMF on groups
in some way responsible for the 9/11 attacks, how are groups to be
treated that were not involved in those attacks-indeed, may not
have existed in 2001-but have allied themselves with groups that
are clearly covered by the AUMF? The Obama Administration
continues to rely on the AUMF as authority for its uses of force
against such groups, but the matter cannot be considered settled.

2.

WHAT IMPACT WILL THE "ARAB SPRING" HAVE ON AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?

There is no possible way to know at this point. The answer to
this question depends on, among many other things, the nature of
the governments that eventually emerge in the region, the stability
of such governments, the future policies of Israel, and the shape of
unanticipated but likely events.
3.

WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE?

To restate the relevant facts, Warsame is a member of al
Shabaab, an Islamist group seeking to take control of Somalia.
Warsame was captured on the high seas and held in custody aboard
16. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 Terrorists,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
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a U.S. Naval vessel. During the first two months of that detention,
he was not provided with Mirandawarnings, was interrogated for
intelligence purposes, and was denied access to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The intelligence personnel
interrogating Warsame were later replaced by members of the FBI,
who questioned Warsame for purposes of a criminal prosecution;
he received the Miranda warnings prior to the commencement of
this interrogation. He also received a visit from the ICRC after the
intelligence interrogation ended.'1
This detention was criticized in a New York Times (the Times)
editorial in July of 2011, primarily because Warsame was not given
his Miranda warnings, was not seized on a battlefield, and was not
personally involved in violent attacks. 8 I think this goes too far.
While Warsame was certainly entitled to humane treatment, a
person seized in the course of warfare is not entitled to be
Mirandized. The matter thus turns on the assumptions in the
editorial that the laws of war cannot ever be applied away from a
battlefield proper or to someone who is neither a member of a
regular military force nor personally involved with violence. I think
that the Times was mistaken to assume the crucial points on which it
based its conclusion. As noted above, it is not obvious whether al
Shabaab is one of the organizations covered by the AUMF; perhaps
it is not, but the argument that it is covered is not absurd. If it is
covered by the AUMF, Warsame's position is quite weak. The
geographical reach of the AUMF is not clear, and it would be
difficult to insist that it could not apply to an al Qaeda affiliate in
Somalia. Likewise, it goes too far to argue that only someone
personally involved in violence could be seized; that view grossly
oversimplifies the ways in which persons not directly involved in
violence can make essential, direct contributions to the activities of
violent organizations. Indeed, the fundamental mistake in the
editorial is its assumption that the only relevant framework within
which to evaluate this incident is criminal law. As pointed out
above, the law of war is also implicated, and its applicability is most
17. Ten Years After the 2001 Authorizationfor Use of Military Force: Current Status of
Legal Authorities, Detention, and Prosecution in the War on Terror: HearingBefore the H.
Armed Services Comm., 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ten Years After] (prepared
testimony of Robert Chesney, Professor, University of Texas School of Law),
available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File-id
=dd0064bl-7416-44ab-bb0c-233d2Ocee4ef.
18. Editorial, Terrorism and the Law, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2011, at SR11,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/opinion/sunday/17sunl.html.
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uncertain. I can do no better than to refer to Professor Robert
Chesney's testimony last July before the House Armed Services
Committee for a discussion of this issue.
4. OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE
UNITED STATES LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE? WHERE IS THE UNITED
STATES MOST VULNERABLE TO ATTACK?

Answering this question requires expertise I do not have.
WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS
BEEN DEFEATED?

5.

If the question is how will we know when the fighting is over, I
would say that we can know that only when al Qaeda and all its
allies have ceased efforts to attack the United States. Since a formal
end of the fighting, analogous to a surrender ceremony, will surely
not happen, I can imagine no other way to make this
determination. If the question is how do we defeat al Qaeda, we
are, again, outside my area of expertise.

19.

Ten Years After, supranote 17.

